Wills--Testator\u27s Intent and the Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation by Lynch, Gary W.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 41 
Issue 3 Summer 1976 Article 20 
Summer 1976 
Wills--Testator's Intent and the Doctrine of Dependent Relative 
Revocation 
Gary W. Lynch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gary W. Lynch, Wills--Testator's Intent and the Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation, 41 MO. L. REV. 
(1976) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/20 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
RECENT CASES
WILLS-TESTATOR'S INTENT AND THE DOCTRINE
OF DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION
Watson v. Landvatter1
In 1958 testator duly executed a will leaving all his property to his
wife, Jennie. The will provided that if his wife predeceased him the prop-
erty should be divided equally among Jennie's nieces and nephews living
at the time of his death. Testator and Jennie were divorced in 1969. Under
Missouri law the divorce revoked the devise to Jennie.2 Later in 1969 the
testator married Alice. The testator died in 1970. When the 1958 will
was filed for probate it was found that in early 1970 the testator had made
several changes in ink on the face of the will. These changes included
marking through Jennie's name and substituting Alice's name above it, and
marking through the names of Jennie's nieces and nephews and replacing
them with the names of Alice's children. After the will was denied probate,
Jennie's nieces and nephews instituted an action to have the will as
originally written declared the last will and testament of the testator
through application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. A
jury verdict for the defendants, Alice and others, was affirmed by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court, which refused to apply the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation.3
Many definitions and explanations have been advanced as to the doc-
trine of dependent relative revocation. The most widely accepted view
among writers is that it is a device used by the courts to provide relief for
the mistaken revocation of a testamentary instrument.4 The doctrine is
phrased in language of "conditional" revocation, but the condition is
usually a fiction. In reality, the act of revocation is treated as ineffective
because it was induced by a mistake of fact or law.5
1. 517 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. En Banc 1974), rehearing denied (1975).
2. See § 474.420, RSMo 1969.
3. 517 S.W.2d at 124.
4. ,See, e.g., 2 W. PAGE, LAw OF WILLS § 21.57 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1960);
T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 88 (2d ed. 1953); Palmer, Dependent Relative Revocation
and its Relation to Relief for Mistake, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 989 (1971); Henderson,
Mistake and Fraud in Wills, 47 B.U.L. REv. 303, 330 (1967); Warren, Dependent
Relative Revocation, 33 HAsav. L. Rxv. 337 (1920); 95 C.J.S. Wills § 267 (1957);
Annots., 62 A.L.R. 1401 (1929), 115 A.L.R. 721 (1938), 24 A.L.R.2d 554 (1952).
But see G. THOMPSON, WILLS § 168 (3d ed. 1947); Cornish, Dependent Relative
Revocation, 5 S. CAL. L. REv. 273 (1932).
5. In jurisdictions where revocation of Will 2, which had earlier revoked
Will 1, cannot revive Will 1, the doctrine is applied so as to admit Will 2 to pro-
bate despite the testator's having torn it up with intent to revoke, if it is shown
that he mistakenly thought that he could revive Will 1 by this means. See, e.g.,
In re Callahan's Estate, 251 Wis. 247, 29 N.W.2d 352 (1947).
Similarly, if a testator executes Will 2 in a defective manner and then tears
up Will 1 in the mistaken belief that Will 2 is valid, Will 1 may be admitted
to probate despite the testator's having torn it up with intent to revoke. See
Board of Trustees of Methodist Church v. Welpton, 284 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. 1955),
where the court held that the testarix's will could be admitted to probate if the
jury found that she destroyed the will after executing ineffective deeds to the
land described in the will. See also T. ATKINSON, supra note 4, at 456. 1
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The largest class of cases involving dependent relative revocation is
that in which the testator revokes or attempts to change his will by some
physical act to the document. 6 This may be accomplished by completely de-
stroying the testamentary instrument or, more commonly, by altering the
provisions in the instrument. The English Wills Act of 18377 and statutes
based on it do not permit revocation of a will by cancellation.5 Some
jurisdictions have statutes that are interpreted as permitting revocation of
an entire will by cancellation but do not allow revocation of part of a will
by physical act to the document.9 In these jurisdictions which do not permit
partial revocation by cancellation, the act of the testator in cancelling
some words and inserting others is given no effect; the will as oiginally
written is admitted to probate.
In jurisdictions like Missouri which permit partial revocation by can-
cellation,10 the unattested insertions cannot be given effect. The cancella-
tions, however, act.as a revocation unless relief is granted by applying the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The most common alteration of
this type is a reduction in the amount of a legacy. If the testator attempts,
by cancellation and interlineation, to reduce a $10,000 legacy to $9,500,
it is probable that if he knew the insertion was ineffective, he would want
the original legacy to take effect. Therefore, application of the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation would carry out his probable intention. If,
on the other hand, the testator attempts in the same manner to reduce a
$10,000 legacy to $5, it is most unlikely that he would want the doctrine
applied to defeat his effort to revoke the legacy by cancellation. Previous
Missouri cases, like the majority of cases in other jurisdictions which per-
mit partial revocation by cancellation, have applied the doctrine -of de-
pendent relative revocation to cancellation and insertion cases without
mention of the probable wishes of the testator if he had known that the in-
6. ,Palmer; supra note 4, at 992. For Missouri cases, see Watson v. 'Land-
vatter, 517 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. En Banc 1974); Board of Trustees of Methodist
Church v. Welpton, 284 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. 1955); Woodson v. Woodsoii, '63 Mo.
978, 255 S.W.2d 771 (En Banc 1953) (dependent relative revocation was applied
to give effect to the original amount of the legacies where testator had tried to re-
duce the amounts); Banks v. Banks, 65 Mo. 432 (1877) (dependent relative revo-
cation was not applied because an absolute revocation was found when the testa-
tor burned his first will after preparing a second will but before the second will
had been executed); Oliver v. Union National Bank, 504 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. App.,
D. Spr. 1974) (dependent relative revocation was applied to reinstate the-plaintiff
as a residuary legatee after the testator had cancelled the plaintiff's name out of
the residuary clause); Varnon v. Varnon, 67 Mo. App. 534 (K.C. Ct. App. 1896)
(dependent relative revocation was applied to admit the will to -probate as
originally written even though the testator attempted to revoke one disposition
by tearing out the fifth page and substituting another for it).
7. Wills Act of 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vic., c. 26, § 20.
8. See, e.g., COLO. Rx-v. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-3 (1963); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-221
(1962).
9. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 113-404 (1933); ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 3, § 46 (1969);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-611 (1964); Oho REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.33 (Page 1968).
10. See Varnon v. Varnon, 67 Mo. App. 534 (K.C. Ct. App. 1896)> where
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sertion could not take effect. 11 This automatic application of the doctrine
achieves the same result as would a jurisdiction that does not permit par-
tial revocation by cancellation.
In Watson the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the view that the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation is subordinate to the rule that
the testator's intent is paramount in interpreting or carrying out his will.' 2
The court looked to extrinsic evidence in order to determine what the testa-
tor's intent would have been had he known that the attempted changes
were ineffective. 13 This included consideration of the change in' the
family situation between the time of execution of the will and the date of
the alterations, and statements made by the testator indicating that he
wished to revoke the legacy to Jennie and that he no longer considered
Jennie's nieces and nephews his kin.14 After reviewing this evidence, the
court held that "there was ample evidence to support the submission to
the jury of the issue as to whether [testator], by making the alterations in
question, intended to cancel the entire document as originally written."'15
The court expressly rejected the plaintiff's contention that the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation should be applied automatically in this
situation,16 stating "the intent of the testator is an important factor which
may present a factual issue concerning revocation."' 7 Thus, Watson dearly
establishes that in Missouri the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
will be. applied to give relief for a revocation by an act to the document
only when the testator would have intended the document as 'originally
written to be effective had he known that the attempted changes'were in-
effective.
The cases are in conflict as to whether the doctrine of dependent rela-
tive revocation should be applied to revocation by a subsequent 'instru-
ment.'3 Revocation by a subsequent instrument which is executed with the
11. Note 6, supra. See, e.g., Varnon v. Varon, 67 Mo. App. 534 (K.C. Ct.-App.
1896); Wolf v. Bollinger, 62 Ill. 368 (1872); In re Bronkowski's Estate, 266 Mich.
112, 253 N.W. 235 (1934); In re Knapen's Will, 75 Vt. 146 (1902); In rie Marvin's
Will, 172 Wis. 457, 179 N.W. 508 (1920). But see Ruel v. Hardy, 90 N.H. -240,
6 A.2d 753 (1939) in which the doctrine was not applied to cancellation of $500
legacies accompanied by interlineation of $100.
12. 517 S.W.2d at 121. The court based its discussion of the ddctrin'e* of de-
pendent relative revocation on and quoted extensively from 95 C.J.S, Wills .§ 267
(1957).
13. 517 S.W.2d at 122. Parol evidence of the testator's intent is admissible to
set a physical act to the instrument in its proper light. 3 J. WiGmo t, EVE.uiu
§ 1782 (3d ed. 1940); 2 W. PAo, supra note 4, at § 21.58; T. ATKINSON; sUpra
note 4.
14. 517 S.W.2d at 122. Cf. Bond v. Riley, 317 Mo. 594, 296 S.W. 401 (1927).
15. 517 S.W.2d at 122.
16. The proponents cited Woodson v. Woodson, 363 Mo. 978, 255 S:W.2d 771(En Banc 1953), and Varnon v. Varnon, 67 Mo. App. 584 (K.C. Ct. App. 1896), as
supporting authority.
17. 517 S.W.2d at 121.
18. The English courts at first refused to apply the doctrine to revocation
by a subsequent instrument containing either an express clause of revocati6n or
inconsistent dispositions, or both. See, e.g., French's case, [1587] 1 Roll. Abr.
614, tit.. Devise (0.)4; Tupper v. Tupper, 1 Kay. & J. 665, 69 Eng. Rep. 627
1976]
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formalities required of a will may be by inconsistent dispositions of prop-
erty, by an express clause of revocation, or by both. The Missouri position
on the application of the doctrine in these situations is not clear, although
the Watson decision arguably clarifies it.
A later will which has a disposition of property that is inconsistent
with the disposition of that property in an earlier will may act as a revo-
cation of the first disposition by its inconsistency, even though the second
disposition cannot be given effect for some reason. In Mort v. Trustees of
Baker University'9 the testator in his first will left the residue of his estate
to Baker University. In his second will the testator left the residue to the
Caldwell County Rural Schools. The court held that the dispositive pro-
vision of the second will was void for uncertainty because the Caldwell
County Rural Schools could not be located. Because the second will was
validly executed and contained an inconsistent disposition, it revoked the
residuary clause in the first will even though the second disposition was
void. This resulted in the residue of the testator's estate passing by in-
testacy. Limiting its search to the four corners of the two instruments,20
the court did not try to ascertain what the testator would have intended
had he known that the second disposition was ineffective. Rather, it tried
only to determine the testator's actual intent at the time of the execution
of the second instrument. The court found no evidence in the instruments
to indicate that the testator did not intend for the second instrument to
act as a revocation of the first instrument by providing for an inconsistent
disposition.
If the Watson approach had been applied to the Mort case, extrinsic
evidence could have been admitted to determine what the testator would
have intended had he known that the second disposition was ineffective. 21
Because both bequests were to educational institutions it seems likely that
the testator, had he known that the second disposition was ineffective,
would have intended for the first disposition to take effect. The doctrine
of dependent relative revocation could have been applied-to achieve this
result. Because partial revocation by inconsistent disposition is conceptually
similar to partial revocation by cancellation, the rationale of the Watson
decision should apply equally as well to both situations. In other words,
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation should be applied to give
relief for revocation by inconsistent dispositions, but only if the testator
would have intended for the first disposition to take effect had he known
that the second disposition was ineffective.
(1855). If the later will does not contain an express clause of revocation, the
English courts will not apply the doctrine to a later will with inconsistent disposi-
tions which fail. See, e.g., Ward v. Van der Loeff, [1924] A.C. 653. Most American
courts do not folow this later English view. See, e.g., Crawford v. Crawford, 225
Miss. 208, 82 So. 2d 823 (1955). See generally 2 W. PAGE, supra note 4, at
§§ 21.60-.62.
19. 229 Mo. App. 632, 78 S.W.2d 498 (K.C. Ct. App. 1935).
20. Id. at 637, 78 S.W.2d at 501.
21. Palmer, supra note 4, at 1006. Extrinsic evidence would be admissible
because the two instruments when viewed together would be ambiguous.
[Vol. 41
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A more difficult problem is the applicability of the doctrine of de-
pendent relative revocation to revocation by an express clause of revocation
in a subsequent testamentary instrument. This situation arises when there
is an express clause of revocation coupled with a disposition which fails
for some reason other than for lack of due execution.22 Many courts have
held that an express clause of revocation is the exclusive evidence of the
testator's intent to revoke any previous testamentary instrument, and
therefore the doctrine of dependent relative revocation should not be ap-
plied.2 3 Some courts, however, without considering the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence, refer only to the two testamentary instruments to de-
termine the testator's intent. If the dispositions in the second will are sub-
stantially similar to the dispositions in the first will, the court will apply
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation to give effect to the first
will notwithstanding the express clause of revocation in the second will.2 4
Other courts have held that extrinsic evidence is admissible to ascertain
the testator's intent only if the mistake which induced the revocation ap-
pears on the face of the instrument.25 A few courts admit extrinsic evidence
to determine what the testator would have intended even though the mis-
take does not appear on the face of the instrument.2 6
The Missouri position is uncertain as to the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence in determining the testator's probable intention in this situation.
The court in Paris v. Erisman,27 although stating that the testator's inten-
tion must be determined from the four corners of the instrument, ad-
mitted extrinsic evidence where the mistake appeared on the face of the
subsequent instrument. 28 In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Jackson29 the court admitted extrinsic evidence of the testator's prob-
able intent because it believed that reading the two instruments together
22. T. ATKINSON, supra note 4, at 462. These reasons include: (1) incapacity
of beneficiary to take; (2) violation of the rule against perpetuities; (3) in-
definiteness; (4) excessiveness in a charitable devise; and (5) charitable disposition
in a will executed within 30 days of death.
23, See, e.g., In re Lubbe's Estate, 142 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1962); Mauzy v. Nel-
son, 147 W. Va. 764, 131 S.E.2d 389 (1963); Tupper v. Tupper, 1 Kay. & J.
665, 69 Eng. Rep. 627 (1855).
24. See, e.g., Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, 187 F.2d
357 (D.C. Cir. 1950); In re Kaufman's Estate, 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831 (1945);
Charleston Library Soc. v. Citizens Se So. Nat. Bank, 200 S.C. 96, 20 S.E.2d 623
(1942); Bernard's Settlement, [1916] 1 Ch. 552.
25. T. ATKINsON, supra note 4, at 459, citing Dunham v. Averill, 45 Conn.
61 (1877); Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R.I. 99 (1852). However, unlike mistake in the in-
ducement to make a will, courts do not require that what the testator would have
done but for the mistake appear on the face of the revoking instrument.
26. See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Jackson, 477 F.2d
319 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Anthony's Estate, 265 Minn. 382, 121 N.WV.2d 772 (1963).
27. 300 S.W. 487 (Mo. 1927).
28. The testator had made a codicil to his will stating that he wished to ex-
clude from his will the land he had deeded to his son, but in describing the land
he excluded more land than he had actually deeded his son. The court admitted
extrinsic evidence as to the amount of land given to the son and held that the
rest of the land passed under the will. Id. at 491.
29. 477 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1973).
19761
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made them ambiguous, notwithstanding the express clause of revocation in
the second instrument.3 0
There are three possible ways to resolve the problem of the admissi-
bility of extrinsic evidence in this situation. First, the parol evidence rule
could be applied without regard to the testator's probable intent. Using
this traditional approach will mean that the first instrument cannot be
given effect. Second, the parol evidence rule could be held to be subor-
dinate to the testator's intent, just as Watson held that the doctrine of de-
pendent relative revocation is subordinate to the testator's intent.3 1 Third,
an exception to the parol evidence rule could be found by reasoning that
the two instruments read together are ambiguous and parol evidence
should be admitted to clarify the ambiguity. If, because of acceptance of
the second or third approach, extrinsic evidence is admitted, then the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation should be applied or not ap-
plied according to the testator's probable intent as determined by that
evidence.
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation should not be a me-
chanical rule of law. The applicability of the doctrine should be de-
termined in accordance with the probable intent of the testator. Watson,
by refusing to apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation auto-
matically, emphasized that Missouri follows this position, at least as to
revocation by physical acts to the document. The same approach should be
used for cases involving revocation by a subsequent testamentary instru-
ment, whether by inconsistent disposition or by an express clause of revo-
cation, because this would more likely give effect to the probable intent
of the testator.
GARY W. LYNcH
30. Decedent had executed a second beneficiary designation naming "Shirley
Ray (Wife)" as beneficiary under his life insurance policy. This designation con-
tained an express clause of revocation of all other designations. The decedent was
never married and it could not be determined who "Shirley Ray" was. The court
held that extrinsic evidence was admissible to ascertain the decedent's probable
intent in determining the applicability of the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation to give effect to a previous beneficiary designation naming decedent's
sister as beneficiary under the policy. Id. at 322.
31. 517 S.W.2d at 121.
[Vol. 41
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